Global Models of Lobbying and Choosing a Model for Ukraine: The Second Year of Institutional Lobbying’s Development

Authors
Lyudmyla Kozhura — Doctor of Law, Professor
Oleksiy Shevchuk — PhD, Attorney, Chairman of the Board of the Ukrainian National Lobbyists Association
Viktoria Chorna — Doctor of Law, Professor

Introduction

The second year of the development of the lobbying industry in Ukraine is no longer a phase of discussions about legalization, but a phase of choosing a path forward. While the main goal at the outset was to recognize lobbying as a legitimate tool for influencing public policy, the question now is much more pressing: what exactly will the Ukrainian model of this institution look like?

International practice does not provide a one-size-fits-all model. Lobbying in different countries has evolved alongside political institutions, the culture of interaction between the government and the business community, and the level of trust in the authorities. That is precisely why mechanically copying any model is not only ineffective but also potentially dangerous. At the same time, ignoring international experience would mean repeating the mistakes of others.

In this context, the second year of the development of the lobbying institution in Ukraine marks a moment when not just legislation is being shaped, but the very architecture of the interplay of interests within the state.

Lobbying as an Institution: The Ukrainian Problem

For a long time, Ukraine operated within a paradigm of de facto lobbying without formal recognition. The interests of businesses, industries, and specific groups influenced policy, but this influence lacked transparent rules. The lack of legal status created a favorable environment for shadow mechanisms, where access to decision-making—rather than arguments—played a key role.

This problem has also been clearly documented in academic research: the lack of regulation limits transparency and increases the risk of corruption.

So, the question is not whether Ukraine needs lobbying—it already exists. The question is whether it will become institutionalized and transparent, or whether it will remain shadowy and selective.

The American Model: Lobbying as Controlled Influence

The United States has established the most formalized lobbying system, in which full transparency is a key principle. A lobbyist cannot operate outside the system: he or she is required to register, disclose clients, and report expenses and contacts with government officials.

This creates a sense of complete transparency: the public knows who is influencing policy and for what purpose. This model integrates lobbying into the democratic process and makes it part of public policy, rather than backroom deals.

At the same time, this system has a downside. The high cost of lobbying effectively raises the barrier to entry, giving large corporations an advantage. Thus, formal transparency does not always guarantee equal influence.

For Ukraine, this model is of interest as an example of institutional discipline, but copying it directly without adaptation could lead to a concentration of influence in the hands of financially powerful players.

The European Model: Politics as a Process of Consultation

The European Union proposes a different approach—not strict control, but structured dialogue. Lobbying is viewed here as a mechanism for involving various interest groups in the policy-making process.

A key element is ongoing consultation between the government, the business community, and civil society. Policy decisions are shaped not only in offices but also through public discussions, where each party has the opportunity to present its position.

This model is more suited to the Ukrainian context, especially given the country’s course toward European integration. It helps prevent the monopolization of influence and creates a more balanced decision-making system.

However, its weakness lies in the complexity and slowness of its procedures, which can be critical during the period of rapid transformation that Ukraine is currently undergoing.

The Canadian Model: A Balance Between Control and Trust

Canada has effectively combined elements of the American and European systems. Mandatory registration and reporting for lobbyists also exist here, but the ethical component and institutional oversight play a particularly important role.

An important element is the so-called “cooling-off period,” which restricts the ability of former officials to immediately transition into lobbying. This helps minimize conflicts of interest and reduce the risks associated with the “revolving door” between government and business.

The Canadian model appears to be the most balanced in terms of its combination of transparency, ethics, and functionality. That is why it is often considered the most relevant for countries with transitional democracies.

The British Approach: The Role of Society and the Media

The United Kingdom takes a less formalized approach, in which not only institutions but also political culture play a significant role. Lobbying here is largely based on public campaigns, media pressure, and public debate.

This model works in contexts where there is a high level of trust in institutions and a developed civil society. For Ukraine, it is of interest as a supplementary element, but cannot serve as a foundation due to different starting conditions.

Ukraine’s Choice: Copy or Create

Scientific approaches clearly indicate that it is advisable for Ukraine to develop its own model by combining international experience with national characteristics.

This means resisting the temptation to “take a ready-made solution” and requiring more complex work—building a system from several components.

The Ukrainian context is unique:
postwar reconstruction, the significant role of international partners, the need for rapid reforms, and, at the same time, the fight against corruption. Under these conditions, the lobbying model must be not only transparent but also functional.

The second year as a turning point in institutional choice

The second year is the most crucial, because at this stage:

• A practice for applying the regulations is being established
• A balance is struck between control and access
• the level of trust in the institution is established

If the system is too strict, it will fade into the background.
If it’s too lenient, it will lose credibility.

Therefore, a hybrid approach appears to be the best option: American-style transparency, the inclusiveness of the European process, the ethical safeguards of the Canadian system, and elements of public oversight.

Conclusion

Ukraine is not faced with a choice between the U.S., the EU, or Canada. It is faced with a choice between an effective and an ineffective model.

Institutional lobbying could become one of the key mechanisms for modernizing the state, but only if it:

• transparent
• accountable
• inclusive
• adapted to Ukrainian conditions

The second year of development is the point at which this choice can still be made consciously. After that, the model will begin to replicate itself.

And right now, the question is being decided: Will lobbying in Ukraine become a tool for development, or will it remain a tool of influence for the privileged few?